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Spinozismo, or how to raise 
higher political consciousness
  
Entrevista com Jonathan Israel
Desde a publicação do seu livro Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the 
Making of Modernity, 1650–1750 (Oxford University Press, 2001), Jonathan 
Israel está contribuindo a uma nova escrita da época moderna, colocando o 
“spinozismo” no centro do jugo. Senior researcher no Institute of Advanced 
Studies (Princeton, USA), ele viaja o mundo defendendo a relevância da filo-
sofia de Spinoza para pensar o conceito de democrácia. Seu novo livro, The 
Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-1848 
(2017), marca uma nova etapa no trabalho dele.
How did Spinoza change in the last fifteen years ? In what sense is this author 
not any more the one the commentators used to read ?
Spinoza has recently become an object not only of philosophical studies, but 
also of intellectual history. To understand this, one must acknowledge the pe-
culiar gap, in some academic cultures, existing between « philosophy » and 
« history of philosophy » on the one hand, and « historical studies » and « in-
tellectual history » on the other. In these countries (France and Brazil seem 
to be some of them), the organisation of academic life didn’t allow to “intel-
lectual history” the place it had in Germany, where it appeared in the XIXth 
century, or later in Italy, Great Britain or in the United States. Now, what is 
the difference? Whereas history of philosophy looks at philosophical ideas, 
philosophers and others things that might have influenced them, focusing on 
the philosophical debate itself, intellectual history is about how philosophers 
and economists, legal reformers, scientists, etc., influence the intelligentsia 
as a group in order to reform and refine institutions. It is about society, but 
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specifically about how intellectual influence impacts politics. It means that 
what matters is not necessarily what society thinks as a whole; there can be 
small groups leading the political debate. It aims at describing a political 
and legal process. As I understand it, this is not part of history of philosophy, 
which has a different focus. This is why intellectual history discusses Spi-
noza’s philosophy on very different terms. 
In this approach, Spinoza appears as one actor among the Spinozist movement. 
And this is not only helpful to explains how Spinoza’s philosophy emerged, 
but also how it contributed to political changes.
This is the reason why I find the book by Jean-Baptiste Stouppe, La Religion 
des Hollandais (1673), but also Cornelis Bontekoe’s notebook and later Pierre 
Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) extremely important, because 
they all describe how Spinoza established a movement. This has never been 
totally accepted by intellectual historians. Antoine Lilti, for example, main-
tains that Spinoza’s circle was isolated, that their publications in Dutch had 
little influence in Europe, and that the reference to Spinoza in the XVIIIth 
century is “déracinée”, far from its original Dutch context. But Stouppe sug-
gests that Spinozism is not just a philosophical movement; it has some fea-
tures of an almost religious sect. Others documents from the period of Bayle 
say that. I want to show that in the wider European scene, early texts of Eng-
lish deism for example – think of John Toland (1670 – 1722) –  are in direct 
connection with Spinozism. A less known example is Matthew Tindal’s book, 
The Rights of the Church Demonstrated (1706). It gave birth to one of the main 
controversies of the XVIIIth century; thirty books were published in reply. 
Why was it seen as so highly offensive ? Because it claimed that the Christian 
church had no political rights regarding society. This certainly doesn’t sound 
like Hobbes, but it recalls an anonymous book, De jure ecclesiasticorum, pub-
lished in Holland in 1665 and certainly written by someone close to Spinoza. 
Tindal took his argument from this text, written in Latin. This shows that a 
huge controversy on the rights of the church came out of a specifically Dutch 
context. But the problem is, European intellectual historians have made a 
gentlemen’s agreement that each of them would claim its own country to have 
played the most important role. This is why the Cambridge school – J. G. A. 
Pocock and Quentin Skinner – didn’t pay enough attention to the Dutch 
Republic.
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But then, it sounds as if everything came from a single origin. Isn’t it strange 
to drawn back this movement to the very person or figure of Spinoza ? 
Shouldn’t we avoid diffusionnism?
I never made Spinoza the cause of everything! The spinozistic diffusionnism 
is a misinterpretation of my argument. I agree very much with you. In many 
cases, Spinoza doesn’t even stand up for radical ideas as clearly as Adriaan 
Koerbagh (1633 – 1669) and Franciscus Van den Enden (1602 – 1674) do. 
Democratic republicanism starts with Pieter De La Court (1618 – 1685) and 
his brother Johan De La Court (1622 – 1660),  then Koerbagh and Van den 
Enden. Spinoza was only able to sum up and express with greater philosophi-
cal depth something that was urgently in the forefront of the intelligentsia of 
the society in which he lived; he also had a great ability to widen the scope, 
extend this spirit to additional areas. One reason of his achievement is that… 
he comes slightly after the other figures. So again, I agree very much with you: 
it’s not Spinoza’s genious as a philosopher (which is beyond question) that 
explains his influence, but a routine inside the particular Dutch context. Spi-
nozism should be seen as coming out from a group, and the Dutch scholars 
have been working on these authors since twenty years. But apart from your 
“Clan Spinoza”, international spinozism still doesn’t pay enough attention to 
these people. It’s not possible to understand the crucial step in the history of 
modernity that lays in a clash between aristocratic and democratic republi-
canism, unless you look at the peculiarities of the Dutch Republic. The oli-
garchs of the Republic we coming from families who, two generations before, 
were nobodies. The brothers De La Court were exiled from Flanders, they 
were new comers to the Dutch Republic and had no access to political life. 
No doubt that is why they adopted their radical political attitude. More gene-
rally, money is the only way to define the Dutch oligarchs – but that is a very 
instable feature. In fact, the Republic itself is very instable. The question then 
is: how to broaden its support? In this context, democratic republicanism is a 
very good option, especially if you value religious toleration and other forms 
of freedom. And toleration itself had been imposed by the fight against Philip 
the Second and the Duke of Alba: during the revolt, people from Nederlands 
had to put aside their religious differences. If they had let the divisions split 
them, they would have had no way to win the struggle. All these conditions 
created a debate where aristocratic and democratic republicanism were in 
collision, and that was on different grounds from any other country.
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The specificities you are pointing seem to cause a spectacular break. How 
does this match with long scale evolutions ? Are there no continuities with 
previous movements ?
Long term perspective is something I will be trying to address in the fourth 
volume of my research1, where I want to distinguish the Radical Enlight-
enment clearly from an underground Radical Renaissance based on Averro-
ism and Epicureanism. I’ll consider what was the significance of clandestine 
movements in the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, and the Reformation. 
And you could say that before the Radical Enlightenment, there is an under-
ground intellectual movement, a form of new Epicureanism, that stands as 
a precursor. But I’ll show that, like Averroism, once these thinkers created 
an intellectual counter-culture that rejected all the premises of the political 
power, they didn’t actually try to reject the regime; they concealed themselves 
like Epicure did in the Garden, far from the prejudices of the clergy, the anger 
of the common people, etc. They had everything of a clandestine movement, 
they were forbidden, they wanted to propagate certain ways of thinking, 
based on rational philosophy, against religious authority. But they accepted 
the political status quo. Whereas Spinoza and the Radical Enlightenment were 
trying to undermine the structures of oppression. They tried to replace them 
not with a revolutionary new program, but with the original principles of the 
political constitutions.
How do you conceive of these historical categories – Moderate and Radical 
Enlightenment, for instance – you contributed to refine?
Well, the difference between Moderate and Radical Enlightenment, for exam-
ple, was meant to particularize our understanding of political ideas. Or cour-
se, there are other categories that could be dropped: liberalism for instance 
is so vague (especially in the XIXth century) that it is misleading; there are 
too many different directions. When a term generates more misuse than help, 
then it should be abandoned. On the contrary, there is a general agreement 
1  J.I. has published so far : Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650 
– 1750 (2001) ; Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French Revolution from The Rights 
of Man to Robespierre (2014) ; The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 
1775-1848 (2017).
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on certain points about Enlightenment: the ideas that many institutions and 
laws are obsolete, that they should be changed or improved, and that philoso-
phy and science will give us the bases and guidelines for these improvements. 
One who would not subscribe to these points, even if he goes frequently to 
coffee-houses in Paris, would not be part of the Enlightenment. And one who 
would, would then find himself in opposition to the spirit of the time, becau-
se Enlightenment is not a “mentalité”. Now, the difference between Moderate 
and Radical Enlightenment actually comes from Leo Strauss. In Leo Strauss’ 
views, the main feature of the Radical Enlightenment is that it is persecuted, 
its partisans must hide, and therefore they should be read between the li-
nes. This category is useful for very complicated cases. Moses Mendelssohn 
(1729 – 1786), for instance, is one of them. He is moderate and radical at 
the same time, because he is not so much concerned with intellectual consis-
tency as achieving certain goals. Nonetheless, we can’t just point out all the 
nuances, contradictions and different strategies. If you just say that there is 
a vast range of possibilities and leave it there, it won’t be very helpful to the 
general reader or even to the scholars. We need broad categories to have a 
discussion, to compare the XVIIth with the XIXth century, to describe general 
phenomenon. After all, why do we think that our institutions are archaic and 
need to be changed, some say intensively, some say only on many aspects ? 
Nor the Chinese thinkers, nor the authors before the XVIIth century, looked 
at society that way. We wouldn’t see this without the Radical Enlightenment. 
We wouldn’t see the novelty of Spinozism without it.
You describe Spinozism as a long term current that seems to run throughout 
history. How do you conceive of the continuity of an intellectual movement? 
What conception of time is conveyed by this type of storytelling?
The continuity lies in the fact that the spinozist concepts have been con-
stantly reintroduced in intellectual history. Think of G. E. Lessing (1729 – 
1781) and Heinrich Heine (1797 – 1856). They are obsessed with Spinoza. 
Why ? Because Heine basically thinks : “we have a revolutionary conscious-
ness and eventually this conscience might achieve real things”. Of course, the 
revolutionary consciousness doesn’t need Spinoza, but with Spinoza, you can 
elevate it to a higher level. Spinoza’s readers can draw from him an ethical 
inspiration which will help underpin the better society they long for. And 
there are so many of these people who keep on reintroducing Spinoza – even 
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today, there is a whole lot of rhetoric about “conatus” and these words… –, 
that I would argue there is a continuous process in a sense. It is not always 
refined, not always rigorous, many writers do strange things with Spinoza 
(see for example Moses Mendelssohn), but his philosophy is still playing an 
inspirational role. It is a powerful force. Another eloquent example: a fellow 
named Ignác Einhorn (1825 – 1875), son of a rabbi, joined the revolutionary 
movement in Budapest and became a proeminent journalist and activist in 
1847-1849; during these years, he became very disillusioned when he discov-
ered that the Magyars leaders were not so keen on securing ethnic minorities’ 
rights in any sense. When the Hungarian revolution became defeated in 1849, 
Einhorn fled to Leipzig and wrote a book called Spinozas Staatslehre, were his 
argument reads as follows. Hegel, Fichte, Schelling all say Spinoza is impor-
tant for philosophy, but they ignore his political thought. This, according to 
Einhorn, is absurd because Spinoza’s political thought is just as important as 
his metaphysics, and is going to change Europe and the world through revo-
lutionary action. This is a good illustration of the significant role Spinozism 
did play. Einhorn is not a great thinker, but his book was very influential. 
You seems to be very confident in the force of ideas.
In the discussion about what democracy is, universal and equal rights again 
have become central for Europeans and Americans since 1848, and the place 
of the individual in society, and how to stabilize and guarantee all the free-
doms of expression, individual liberty of conviction, etc., are today vital in 
our societies. What can we do to understand and promote that ? The Marxists 
historians who studied XVIIth century were often looking at mass movement 
and great shifts, and were not really looking at the position of the individu-
als within the society. Although it has appeared here and there, one of the 
most important things about Spinoza is the articulation between individual 
and society. Anarchist traditions preserved this aspect better than Marxist 
traditions. On a small scale, anarchists are good at promoting the individual 
freedoms, but they are not interested in their constitutional forms, nor how 
to build a democratic state. Spinoza was very interested by both aspects. So 
the way Radical Enlightenment conceived of oppression and human misery 
in the world differs from the way socialists did. That seems to me very impor-
tant. Both movement agree that we could live much better, because we are 
under an oppression that makes the majority of humans live an unnecessary 
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miserable life. And fairly, that could be changed. But these movements disa-
gree on the causes of oppression. Radical Enlightenment considers it happens 
because our ideas are all wrong. And if we could change the way people think, 
then we would have a better society. Now, according to socialism, ideas are 
not the issue; the problem is that the economic system is all wrong, and if 
you could take hold of the economic system and change it, then we would 
have a happier life. As you see, both the perspective and the emphasis is very 
different about how to remedy to a problem they basically agree on. That 
is why spinozism today would need to be more comprehensively a « post-
-marxist spinozism ». There are changes and transformations in society that 
can be explained in terms of philosophical ideas, changes of understanding, 
new writings, science, etc. That is the function of Enlightenment. Nicolas de 
Condorcet (1743 – 1794), just before he died, maintained that the demo-
cratic republic is the best form of government, provided you can enlighten 
the society sufficiently and raise the educational level to the point where it 
works. If you can’t do that, it’s better not to try, because if you try to build a 
democratic republic with a ignorant and superstitious society, you will end 
up with more turmoil than before. Again, the educational issue might be why 
the Radical Enlightenment is regaining force today. Doesn’t the “spinozismo” 
play a role in Brasil and latin America in general since the 1970s ? This would 
illustrate how, in a post-marxist context, Spinozism might be a way to help 
the intelligentsias see how to stabilize democratic forms and systems. In any 
case, they are enthusiasts who think politics in these terms, and that, in itself, 
is interesting.
